Disagreement and epistemic improvement

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Simion, M. (2021) Disagreement and epistemic improvement. Synthese, 199, pp. 14641-14665. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03437-5)

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This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This research has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 948356) and a Leonardo Grant from the BBVA Foundation.
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Broncano-Berrocal, F., and Simion, M.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:COGITO Epistemology Research Centre
Journal Name:Synthese
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:01 November 2021
Copyright Holders:Copyright © The Author(s) 2021
First Published:First published in Synthese 199: 14641-14665
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
309239Knowledge-First Social EpistemologyMona SimionEuropean Research Council (ERC)948356Arts - Philosophy