Epistemic vice and epistemic nudging: a solution?

Meehan, D. (2020) Epistemic vice and epistemic nudging: a solution? In: Axtell, G. and Bernal, A. (eds.) Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Series: Collective studies in knowledge and society. Rowman & Littlefield: London ; New York. ISBN 9781786615732

Abstract

‘Bad’ epistemic behavior is unfortunately commonplace. Take, for example, those who believe in conspiracy theories, trust untrustworthy news sites or refuse to take seriously the opinion of their epistemic peers. Sometimes this kind of behavior is sporadic or “out of character”; however, more concerning are those cases that display deeply embedded character traits, attitudes and thinking styles (Cassam 2016). When this is the case, these character traits, attitudes and thinking styles are identified by vice epistemologists as epistemic or intellectual vices. Considering that these vices often block or subvert the acquisition of epistemic goods such as knowledge or truth, it is important for epistemologists to understand how these kinds of traits can be most effectively mitigated. One currently unexplored way in which we might go about doing so is by employing epistemically paternalistic strategies, particularly the strategy of “epistemic nudging” (here on EN)—the practice of altering an agent’s decision-making capacities toward a desired outcome (Thaler and Sunstein 2009)...

• Item Type: Book Sections
• Status: Published
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Meehan, Daniella
• Authors: Meehan, D.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
• ISBN: 9781786615732