When is authorial intention not authorial intention?

McLoughlin, C. and Gardner, C. (2007) When is authorial intention not authorial intention? European Journal of English Studies, 11(1), pp. 93-105. (doi: 10.1080/13825570601183427)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13825570601183427

Abstract

This article uses the practice of the law of England and Wales to illuminate what is happening when literary theorists invoke authorial intention. We argue that in interpreting contracts, wills and statutes, judges employ the language of intention (what the contractor/testator/legislature 'meant') to inform their decisions, but that this linguistic usage is misleading. For in practice, judicial interpretation is firmly text-based. The language of intention remains solely to foster certain illusions about the ability freely to contract, bequeath possessions and enact legislation on a democratic basis. Applying this model to literary interpretation, we find a similar sleight-of-hand taking place. While theorists such as E. D. Hirsch and Stanley Fish promote authorial intention as the basis of interpretation, their actual practice is a matter of text-based hermeneutics.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:McLoughlin, Dr Catherine
Authors: McLoughlin, C., and Gardner, C.
Subjects:P Language and Literature > PR English literature
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Critical Studies > English Literature
Journal Name:European Journal of English Studies
ISSN:1382-577

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