Suffering and punishment

Brady, M. S. (2020) Suffering and punishment. In: Amaya, A. and Del Mar, M. (eds.) Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning. Hart Publishing: Oxford ; London, pp. 139-156. ISBN 9781509925131

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This paper offers a defence of the Communicative Theory of Punishment against recent criticisms due to Matt Matravers. According to the Communicative Theory, the intentional imposition of suffering by the judiciary is justified because it is intrinsic to the condemnation and censure that an offender deserves as a result of wrongdoing. Matravers raises a number of worries about this idea – grounded in his thought that suffering isn’t necessary for censure, and as a consequence sometimes the imposition of suffering can be unjust. I respond by arguing that the imposition of suffering is an essential part of a suite of emotional responses that wrongdoing merits. As a result, and contrary to what Matravers suggests, words are not enough for censure and condemnation.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brady, Professor Michael
Authors: Brady, M. S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:Hart Publishing
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 The editors and contributors
First Published:First published in Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning: 139-156
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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