The role of emotion in intellectual virtue

Brady, M. S. (2018) The role of emotion in intellectual virtue. In: Battaly, H. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: New York ; London, pp. 47-58. ISBN 9781138890206 (doi: 10.4324/9781315712550-5)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Publisher's URL:


Emotions are important for virtue, both moral and intellectual. This chapter aims to explain the significance of emotion for intellectual virtue along two dimensions. The first claim is that epistemic emotions can motivate intellectual inquiry, and thereby constitute ways of 'being for' intellectual goods. As a result, such emotions can constitute the motivational components of intellectual virtue. The second claim is that other emotions, rather than motivating intellectual inquiry and questioning, instead play a vital role in the regulation and control of intellectual activities. Emotions are usually characterized, in philosophy and psychology, as having a number of components or elements. Thus emotions are held to involve elements of perception, appraisal, feeling, attention, valence, facial expression, and motivation.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brady, Professor Michael
Authors: Brady, M. S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Published Online:24 September 2018

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record