Knowledge and reasoning

Simion, M. (2021) Knowledge and reasoning. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 10371-10388. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z)

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This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This research was funded by the Mind Association (Mind Fellowship for the ‘Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions’ project, 2018–2019) and the European Research Council (KnowledgeLab: Knowledge First Social Epistemology project, grant agreement 948,356)).
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:COGITO Epistemology Research Centre
Journal Name:Synthese
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:21 June 2021
Copyright Holders:Copyright © The Author(s) 2021
First Published:First published in Synthese 199(3): 10371-10388
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
309239Knowledge-First Social EpistemologyMona SimionEuropean Research Council (ERC)948356Arts - Philosophy