Enough is too much: the excessiveness objection to sufficientarianism

Knight, C. (2022) Enough is too much: the excessiveness objection to sufficientarianism. Economics and Philosophy, 38(2), pp. 275-299. (doi: 10.1017/S0266267121000171)

Abstract

The standard version of sufficientarianism maintains that providing people with enough, or as close to enough as is possible, is lexically prior to other distributive goals. This article argues that this is excessive – more than distributive justice allows – in four distinct ways. These concern the magnitude of advantage, the number of beneficiaries, responsibility and desert, and above-threshold distribution. Sufficientarians can respond by accepting that providing enough unconditionally is more than distributive justice allows, instead balancing sufficiency against other considerations.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Knight, Dr Carl
• Authors: Knight, C.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics
• Journal Name: Economics and Philosophy
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• ISSN: 0266-2671
• ISSN (Online): 1474-0028
• Published Online: 29 June 2021
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2021 The Author
• First Published: First published in Economics and Philosophy 38(2): 275-299
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy