Simion, M. (2021) Skepticism about epistemic dilemmas. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. ISBN 9781003134565 (doi: 10.4324/9781003134565-9)
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Abstract
Talk of epistemic dilemmas is old talk in epistemology. But are there such things? In this paper I argue for modest skepticism about epistemic dilemmas. In order to do that, I first point out that not all normative conflicts constitute dilemmas: more needs to be the case. Second, I look into the moral dilemmas literature for inspiration and identify a set of conditions that need to be at work for a mere normative conflict to be a genuine normative dilemma. Last, I argue that, while our epistemic life is peppered with epistemic normative conflict, epistemic dilemmas are much harder to find than we thought.
Item Type: | Book Sections |
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Status: | Published |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Simion, Professor Mona |
Authors: | Simion, M. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Research Group: | COGITO Epistemology Research Centre |
Publisher: | Routledge |
ISBN: | 9781003134565 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2021 Routledge |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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