Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(1), pp. 203-216. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12964)
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Abstract
This article develops and defends a full account of the nature and normativity of resistance to evidence, according to which resistance to evidence is an instance of input-level epistemic malfunctioning. At the core of this epistemic normative picture lies the notion of knowledge indicators, as evidential probability increasing facts that one is in a position to know; resistance to evidence is construed as a failure to uptake knowledge indicators.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Simion, Professor Mona |
Authors: | Simion, M. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Research Group: | COGITO Epistemology Research Centre |
Journal Name: | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
Publisher: | Wiley |
ISSN: | 0031-8205 |
ISSN (Online): | 1933-1592 |
Published Online: | 05 March 2023 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2023 The Authors |
First Published: | First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108(1):203-216 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons license |
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