Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe

Simion, M. (2024) Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(1), pp. 203-216. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12964)

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This article develops and defends a full account of the nature and normativity of resistance to evidence, according to which resistance to evidence is an instance of input-level epistemic malfunctioning. At the core of this epistemic normative picture lies the notion of knowledge indicators, as evidential probability increasing facts that one is in a position to know; resistance to evidence is construed as a failure to uptake knowledge indicators.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:COGITO Epistemology Research Centre
Journal Name:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
ISSN (Online):1933-1592
Published Online:05 March 2023
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2023 The Authors
First Published:First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108(1):203-216
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons license

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