Against the doctrine of infallibility

Willard-Kyle, C. (2021) Against the doctrine of infallibility. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4), pp. 758-779. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa082)

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Abstract According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can’t be wrong about but shouldn’t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Willard-Kyle, Dr Christopher
Authors: Willard-Kyle, C.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:Oxford University Press
ISSN (Online):1467-9213
Published Online:24 December 2020

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