Kemp, G. (2022) Observation sentences revisited. Mind, 131(523), pp. 805-825. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzaa103)
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Abstract
I argue for an alternative to Quine’s conception of observation sentences, one that better satisfies the roles Quine envisages for them, and that otherwise respects Quinean constraints. After reviewing a certain predicament Quine got into in balancing the needs of the intersubjectivity of observation sentences with his notion of the stimulus meaning of an observation sentence, I push for replacing the latter with what I call the ‘stimulus field’ of an observation sentence, a notion that remains ‘proximate’ but is shared between different language users. Throughout, I emphasize the epistemological role of observation sentences.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kemp, Dr Gary |
Authors: | Kemp, G. |
College/School: | College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Mind |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
ISSN: | 0026-4423 |
ISSN (Online): | 1460-2113 |
Published Online: | 15 July 2021 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2020 Mind Association |
First Published: | First published in Mind 131(523): 805-825 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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