II—Two routes to radical racial pluralism

Jenkins, K. (2019) II—Two routes to radical racial pluralism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 93(1), pp. 49-68. (doi: 10.1093/arisup/akz008)

Abstract

Quayshawn Spencer (2019) argues for radical racial pluralism, the position that there is a plurality of natures and realities for race in the United States. In this paper, I raise two difficulties for Spencer’s argument. The first is targeted narrowly at his response to a potential objection to his argument, and the second is a more general difficulty to do with how the argument handles the social consequences of the authoritative categorization of people. Although the second difficulty is more serious than the first, neither is insurmountable. I then sketch an alternative argument for radical racial pluralism, one that would be likely to succeed in the event that Spencer’s argument turned out to fail. Considering these two contrasting routes to radical racial pluralism highlights the fact that radical racial pluralism is a rather more modest metametaphysical position than it may have initially appeared to be. In virtue of this, I suggest that we should develop and assess a more radically pluralist metametaphysical account of race, which I term ‘ultra-radical racial pluralism’.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Jenkins, Dr Katharine
• Authors: Jenkins, K.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
• Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP) on behalf of Aristotelian Society
• ISSN: 0309-7013
• ISSN (Online): 1467-8349