Jenkins, K. (2020) Ontic injustice. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(2), pp. 188-205. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2019.27)
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Abstract
In this article, I identify a distinctive form of injustice—ontic injustice—in which an individual is wronged by the very fact of being socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind. To be a member of a certain social kind is, at least in part, to be subject to certain social constraints and enablements, and these constraints and enablements can be wrongful to the individual who is subjected to them, in the sense that they inflict a moral injury. The concept of ontic injustice is valuable in three main ways: (1) it draws our attention to the role played by social kinds in enacting wrongful constraints and enablements; (2) it clarifies our options for developing accounts of the ontology of particular social kinds, such as gender kinds; and (3), along with the related concept of ‘ontic oppression’, it helps us to understand and respond to oppression.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Jenkins, Dr Katharine |
| Authors: | Jenkins, K. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Journal of the American Philosophical Association |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Philosophical Association |
| ISSN: | 2053-4477 |
| ISSN (Online): | 2053-4485 |
| Published Online: | 23 June 2020 |
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