The prospects of emotional dogmatism

Harrison, E. (2021) The prospects of emotional dogmatism. Philosophical Studies, 178(8), pp. 2535-2555. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-020-01561-5)

Abstract

The idea that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate and defeasible justification to evaluative belief has been amassing significant support in recent years. The proposal that it is my anger, say, that justifies my belief that I’ve been wronged putatively provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as to how we receive epistemic justification for a rich catalogue of our evaluative beliefs. However, despite the fact that this justificatory thesis of emotion is fundamentally an epistemological proposal, comparatively little has been done to explicitly isolate what it is about emotions that bestows them with justificatory ability. The purpose of this paper is to provide a novel and thorough analysis into the prospects of phenomenology-based—or dogmatist—views of emotional justification. By surveying and rejecting various instantiations of the emotional dogmatist view, I endeavour to provide an inductive case for the conclusion that emotional phenomenology cannot be the seat of the emotions’ power to immediately justify evaluative belief.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Harrison, Eilidh
• Authors: Harrison, E.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities
• Journal Name: Philosophical Studies
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0554-0739
• ISSN (Online): 2153-8379
• Published Online: 06 October 2020
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2020 The Author
• First Published: First published in Philosophical Studies 178(8): 2535-2555
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License