Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat

Kelp, C. (2020) Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 192-204. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12180)

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This paper is about internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. It has three aims. The first is to develop an argument against internalism to the effect that the correct epistemology of defeat must be externalist (Section 1). The second is to show that cases involving defeat also cause trouble for phenomenal conservatism (Sections 2 and 3). The third is to cast doubt on the idea that phenomenal conservatism might work as a specific thesis about the status of seemings of particular kinds as justifiers. In particular, I will ask whether perceptual seemings might still be justifiers and provide some reason for pessimism (Section 4).

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Issues
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN (Online):1758-2237
Published Online:19 September 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 The Authors
First Published:First published in Philosophical Issues 30(1):192-204
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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