Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat

Kelp, C. (2020) Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 192-204. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12180)

Abstract

This paper is about internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. It has three aims. The first is to develop an argument against internalism to the effect that the correct epistemology of defeat must be externalist (Section 1). The second is to show that cases involving defeat also cause trouble for phenomenal conservatism (Sections 2 and 3). The third is to cast doubt on the idea that phenomenal conservatism might work as a specific thesis about the status of seemings of particular kinds as justifiers. In particular, I will ask whether perceptual seemings might still be justifiers and provide some reason for pessimism (Section 4).

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kelp, Professor Christoph
• Authors: Kelp, C.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophical Issues
• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
• ISSN: 1533-6077
• ISSN (Online): 1758-2237
• Published Online: 19 September 2020
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2020 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Philosophical Issues 30(1):192-204
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License