Closure, warrant transmission, and defeat

Simion, M. (2022) Closure, warrant transmission, and defeat. In: Jope, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Epistemic Closure and Transmission. Routledge. ISBN 9781003104766 (doi: 10.4324/9781003104766-4)

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This chapter develops a novel Neo-Moorean view. The view falls squarely within the Radical Neo-Moorean camp, in that it holds that closure holds unrestrictedly, warrant transmits through Moore’s inference, and that there is nothing wrong – epistemically or dialectically – with Moore’s argument. Nevertheless, the account is superior to extant Radical Neo-Mooreanisms in explanatory power: it explains both the precise variety of epistemic failure exhibited by the sceptic, and the intuition of reasonableness when it comes to the sceptic’s resistance to Moore’s argument. It does so in terms of epistemic functions and contrary-to-duty obligations.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:COGITO Epistemology Research Centre

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