Gender, race, and group disagreement

Miragoli, M. and Simion, M. (2020) Gender, race, and group disagreement. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 125-138. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-7)

[img] Text
222809.pdf - Accepted Version


Publisher's URL:


This paper has two aims. The first is critical: it argues that our mainstream epistemology of disagreement does not have the resources to explain what goes wrong in cases of group-level epistemic injustice. The second is positive: we argue that a functionalist account of group belief and group justification delivers an account of the epistemic peerhood relation between groups that (1) accommodates minority and oppressed groups, and (2) diagnoses the epistemic injustice cases correctly as cases of unwarranted belief on the part of the oppressor group.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona and Miragoli, Martin
Authors: Miragoli, M., and Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:COGITO Epistemology Research Centre
Published Online:24 November 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2021 Taylor and Francis
First Published:First published in The Epistemology of Group Disagreement: 9-45
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record