Levy, Y. J. (2020) On games without approximate equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory, 49(4), pp. 1125-1128. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-020-00734-0)
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Abstract
This note shows that the work by Simon and Tomkowicz (Israel J Math 227(1):215–231, 2018) answers another outstanding open question in game theory in addition to the non-existence of approximate Harsányi equilibrium in Bayesian games: it shows that strategic form games with bounded and separately continuous payoffs need not possess approximate equilibria.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Levy, Dr John |
| Authors: | Levy, Y. J. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0020-7276 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1432-1270 |
| Published Online: | 08 September 2020 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2020 The Author |
| First Published: | First published in International Journal of Game Theory 49(4): 1125-1128 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons license |
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