Frontloading, supposition, and contraction

Pickel, B. (2016) Frontloading, supposition, and contraction. Philosophical Quarterly, 66(264), pp. 559-578. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqv112)

Abstract

In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provided by our senses and introspection. Thus, on the basis of core evidence, one also can know (S) that water covers the majority of the Earth. This knowledge, Chalmers suggests, requires a great deal of a priori knowledge. Chalmers argues that even if one suspends belief in one's core evidence, one can nevertheless reason from a description of this evidence to an ordinary claim such as S. Chalmers concludes that the ordinary claim must be a priori entailed by a description of the core evidence. However, I propose that careful thinking about belief suspension reveals that empirical information can contaminate the reasoning from the core evidence to the ordinary claim S, even if belief in the core evidence is suspended. One result is that empiricists and externalists may freely appeal to thought experiments without having to concede that there are substantive a priori truths.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Pickel, Dr Bryan
• Authors: Pickel, B.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophical Quarterly
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• ISSN: 0031-8094
• ISSN (Online): 1467-9213
• Published Online: 06 November 2015