Pickel, B. and Schulz, M. (2018) Quinean updates: In defense of "two dogmas". Journal of Philosophy, 115(2), pp. 57-91. (doi: 10.5840/jphil201811524)
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Abstract
Quine challenged traditional views of the a priori by appealing to two key premises: that any statement may be held true “come what may” and that no statement is immune to revision in light of new experience. Chalmers has recently developed a seemingly compelling response to each of these claims. The critique is particularly threatening because it seems to rest on the Bayesian premise that upon acquiring evidence E, a rational agent will update her credence in any statement S to equal her prior conditional credence in S given E. We argue that Chalmers’s criticisms misfire. When properly understood, Quine’s two theses are largely consistent with Bayesianism.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Pickel, Dr Bryan |
| Authors: | Pickel, B., and Schulz, M. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Philosophy |
| Publisher: | Journal of Philosophy |
| ISSN: | 0022-362X |
| ISSN (Online): | 1939-8549 |
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