Collective (telic) virtue epistemology

Carter, J. A. (2020) Collective (telic) virtue epistemology. In: Alfano, M., de Ridder, J. and Klein, C. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge: London. (Accepted for Publication)

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Abstract

A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically affirming that p. An advantage of the proposal developed is that it is shown to be compatible with competing views—viz., joint acceptance accounts and social-distributive accounts—of how group members must interact in order to materially realise a group belief. I conclude by showing how the proposed judgment-focused collective (telic) virtue epistemology has important advantages over a rival version of collective virtue epistemology defended in recent work by Jesper Kallestrup (2016).

Item Type:Book Sections
Status:Accepted for Publication
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Professor J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:Routledge
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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
306621A Virtue Epistemology of TrustJoseph CarterLeverhulme Trust (LEVERHUL)RPG-2019-302Arts - Philosophy