Fitting attitudes and forgiveness

Pettigrove, G. (2021) Fitting attitudes and forgiveness. In: McKenna, M., Nelkin, D. and Warmke, B. (eds.) Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 57-82. ISBN 9780190602147 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190602147.001.0001)

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In philosophical discussions of wrongdoing, it is common to find people saying things such as, “If a person has been wronged, she should resent the wrongdoer.” Writers don’t always say why, but, if one wished to defend the claim, a promising place to turn would be to fitting attitude theories of value: One should feel anger or resentment, because that is the fitting (or accurate) response to wrongdoing. Fitting attitude theory can also help explain why some reasons for forgiving strike us as the wrong kinds of reasons. However, in spite of its attractions, I argue that fitting attitude theory fails to support the claim that those who have been wronged should be angry or resentful rather than forgiving. The argument highlights gaps that must be filled by any theory that attempts to move from judgments of fittingness to full-blown moral judgments.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Pettigrove, Professor Glen
Authors: Pettigrove, G.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:Oxford University Press

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