Online Appendix to

'Compliance with pension-related mandatory disclosures and debt financing'

This file includes tables on the reliability tests of the different disclosure variables, the

development of the automated score of mandatory and voluntary pension-related disclosures,

detailed definitions and sources of all variables, the first-stage results obtained from the IV

estimation and the robustness tests performed to check the sensitivity of the results. It is

structured as follows:

Supplementary\_Table\_I: Reliability tests

Supplementary\_Table\_II: Development of the automated score of mandatory and voluntary

pension-related disclosure

Supplementary\_Table\_III: Detailed definitions and sources of all variables

Supplementary\_Table\_IV: First-stage results (2SLS regression)

Supplementary\_Table\_V: Sensitivity analyses for access to the public debt market (Hypothesis

1)

Supplementary\_Table\_VI: Sensitivity analyses for the cost of debt (Hypotheses 2 and 3)

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Supplementary\_Table\_I: Reliability tests

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables	DV=Pension_	DV=Pension_	DV=Provision_	DV=Provision_	DV=log(1+	$DV = log(1 + Vol{-})$
	ActuDisc.	ActuDisc.	ActuDisc.	AdjDisc	DiscFinancials)	DiscNarratives)
log(Size)	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.17***	0.23***
	(5.51)	(3.46)	(5.13)	(4.07)	(8.75)	(8.59)
log(Age)	0.01	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.03**	0.12**	0.11
	(0.59)	(-1.72)	(-0.41)	(-2.09)	(2.41)	(1.40)
Leverage	0.06	0.08	0.04	-0.00	0.31	$0.57^{*}$
	(1.07)	(1.04)	(0.72)	(-0.03)	(1.32)	(1.81)
ROA	$0.29^{**}$	-0.03	-0.08	-0.13	-0.38	0.74
	(2.01)	(-0.17)	(-0.80)	(-0.87)	(-0.67)	(0.98)
Big4	$0.08^{**}$	$0.09^{**}$	$0.04^{*}$	0.06**	0.32**	0.54**
	(2.00)	(2.07)	(1.67)	(2.13)	(2.08)	(2.51)
Cross listed	-0.01	$0.06^{**}$	0.02	$0.06^{***}$	0.06	-0.13
	(-0.67)	(2.36)	(1.19)	(2.68)	(0.88)	(-1.03)
og(Sales growth)	-0.09**	-0.07	-0.05	-0.05	-0.43*	-0.53
	(-2.45)	(-1.08)	(-1.23)	(-1.31)	(-1.83)	(-1.44)
Pension deficit	0.29***	-0.42***			$2.80^{***}$	4.97***
	(2.66)	(-3.25)			(5.02)	(7.89)
Country rule of law	0.24***	-0.13**	0.14***	0.04	0.83***	-0.17
	(5.37)	(-2.37)	(3.20)	(0.73)	(4.22)	(-0.57)
Acc. enforcement	0.00	0.01***	-0.00	$0.02^{***}$	0.00	$0.04^{***}$
	(1.40)	(3.62)	(-1.29)	(8.56)	(0.44)	(2.90)
Constant	0.11	0.06	0.64***	-0.77***	1.47	-0.39
	(0.52)	(0.18)	(2.61)	(-3.40)	(1.24)	(-0.21)
Industry dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Observations	661	661	589	589	661	661
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.21	0.14	0.17	0.31	0.334	0.30
F	8.42	4.31	8.13	15.56	12.15	11.73

The table presents the results for the validity and reliability of the measures of disclosure. Specifically, it presents the results when regressing the measures of disclosure on commonly identified determinants of disclosure.  $Pension\_Actu\_Disc$ . is the actual level of compliance with pension-related disclosures.  $Pension\_Adj\_Disc$ . is the level of compliance with provisions-related disclosures.  $Pension\_Adj\_Disc$ . is the level of compliance with provisions disclosures adjusted to the country disclosure level.  $Pension\_Actu\_Disc$ . is the actual level of compliance with provisions-related disclosures.  $Pension\_Adj\_Disc$ . is the level of compliance with provisions disclosures adjusted to the country disclosure level.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the natural logarithm of the number of times the firm uses pension-related terms in the financial section (back-end) of its annual report.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the natural logarithm of the number of times the firm uses pension-related terms in the narrative section (front-end) of its annual report.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the natural logarithm of sales/revenues.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the natural logarithm of the number of times the firm uses pension-related terms in the narrative section (front-end) of its annual report.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the natural logarithm of sales/revenues.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the natural logarithm of sales/revenues.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the natural logarithm of sales/revenues.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the natural logarithm of sales growth over the last three years.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the difference between the present value of pension liabilities and the market value of pension plan assets scaled by total assets.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the difference between the present value of pension liabilities and the market value of pension plan assets scaled by total assets.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the difference between the present value of pension liabilities and the market value of pension plan assets scaled by total assets.  $Pension\_Pince$  is the country rule of law is the country rule of

# Supplementary\_Table\_II: Development of automated score of mandatory and voluntary pension-related disclosure

As discussed in section 3.2, we check whether relying on a dictionary-based automated measure of mandatory disclosure could be a substitute for the hand-collected of data. Moreover, in section 4.3.3, we discuss additional analyses that examine the role of pension-related voluntary disclosures. This online appendix discusses the process for developing these two automated disclosure scores.

First, we developed a list of common pension-related terms by extracting the most frequent two adjacent words (hereafter terms)<sup>1</sup> in IAS 19R *Employee Benefits*, which was the applicable standard for our sample period. Since the extracted terms from IAS 19R contain pension-specific terms and non-pension-specific terms (e.g. the terms 'an entity', 'value of', 'reporting period'), as well as stop adjacent words (e.g. the terms 'of the', 'in the', 'as a'), there was a need to confine the list of terms to pension-specific terms. One researcher from the research team went over the full list of terms obtained from the content of IAS 19 and excluded non-pension-specific terms, as well as stop adjacent terms. This resulted in a list containing 28 terms. Then, the word 'pension' was added to the list, which resulted in a first draft list containing 29 pension-related terms. Subsequently, a second researcher from the research team reviewed the most frequent two adjacent words, independently. She recommended the addition of six more terms to the list. This was followed by a discussion with the third researcher, who also confirmed the six pension-related terms identified by the other two researchers. This process and debate among the researchers resulted in a valid final list containing 35 pension-related terms in IAS 19R (presented in the table below).

Following the development and validation of the list, we split each company's annual report into two parts as in Mazzi, Slack, Tsalavoutas, and Tsoligkas (2019):<sup>2</sup> the 'narratives' (front-end) and the 'financials' section (back-end of the annual report). The latter consists of the financial statements, the auditors' reports and the notes to the financial statements and the former consists of the remaining preceding pages of an annual report. We then use the MaxDictio application of MaxQDA to search each part of the annual report and identify the

<sup>1</sup> We confirm that relying on three adjacent words as an alternative captures almost identical information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Mazzi, F. Slack, R. Tsalavoutas, I. & Tsoligkas F. (2019). The capitalisation debate: research and development expenditure, disclosure content, and quantity and stakeholder views. ACCA research monograph. https://www.accaglobal.com/gb/en/professional-insights/global-profession/the-capitalisation-debate.html

number of times each firm uses pension-related information as extracted from IAS 19R (i.e. *Disc.\_Financials* and *Disc.\_Narratives*. For the back-end section, we compute the  $log(1+Disc._Financials)$  to check whether the automated measure could substitute the hand-collection of data and for the front-end, we compute  $log(1+Vol.\_Disc.\_Narratives)$  to proxy for pension-related voluntary disclosure.<sup>3</sup>

List of pension terms

Term #	Term	Number of occurrences in IAS 19R
1	Pension	
2	defined benefit	172
3	the plan	106
4	employee benefits	83
5	post employment	71
6	service cost	54
7	benefit plan	51
8	net defined	50
9	plan assets	49
10	present value	47
11	benefit plans	43
12	a defined	42
13	constructive obligation	39
14	benefit liability	38
15	employment benefits	37
16	benefit obligation	37
17	termination benefits	36
18	the defined	34
19	defined contribution	30
20	actuarial assumptions	29
21	past service	23
22	multi employer	21
23	employment benefit	21
24	current service	21
25	employee benefit	21
26	contribution plans	16
27	asset ceiling	16
28	benefit obligations	14
29	actuarial gains	14
30	insurance policy	14
31	employees render	13
32	ias 19	13
33	contribution plan	12
34	employee service	12
35	plan amendment	10_

List of pension related terms extracted from IAS 19 used in the dictionary based automated textual analyses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> We acknowledge that an ideal measure of voluntary disclosure should also capture voluntary disclosures provided in the financial statements (back-end section of the annual reports). However, it is hard to rely on automated content analysis to obtain a measure of disclosure that excludes the disclosure required by accounting standards. In other words, the automated content analyses for the notes to financial statements will produce a measure of disclosure that captures both mandatory and voluntary disclosures.

## Supplementary\_Table\_III: Detailed definitions and sources of all variables

Firm-specific variables

Pension\_Actu.\_Disc. Is a firm's actual level of compliance with pension-related disclosures. It

represents the total number of pension items disclosed by the firm to the total number of applicable items (Source: hand-collected from annual reports).

Pension\_Adj.\_Disc. Is a firm's level of compliance with pension-related disclosures adjusted to the

country disclosure level. It represents a firm's pension-related disclosure score over and above the country minimum score (Source: hand-collected from

annual reports).

Provision\_Actu.\_Disc. Is a firm's actual level of compliance with provisions and contingencies

disclosures. It represents the total number of provisions and contingencies items disclosed by the firm to the total number of applicable items (Source:

hand-collected from firms' annual reports).

Provision\_Adj.\_Disc. Is a firm's level of compliance with provisions and contingencies disclosures

adjusted to the country disclosure level. It represents a firm's provisions-related disclosure score over and above the country minimum score (Source:

hand-collected from firms' annual reports).

mandatory disclosure.

terms in the 'financials' section (back-end) of its annual report.

log(1+Vol.\_Disc.\_Narratives) Is the natural logarithm of the number of times the firm uses pension-related

terms in the 'narratives' section (front-end) of its annual report.

log(Size) Is the natural logarithm of sales/revenues in USD (WC01001) (Source:

Datastream).

Tangibility Is PPE (WC02501) divided by total assets (WC02999) (Source: Datastream).

MTB Is market capitalization (WC08001)) divided by common shareholders' equity

(WC03501) (Source: Datastream).

ROA Is net income (WC07250) divided by total assets (WC02999) (Source:

Datastream).

Leverage Is long-term debt (WC03251) divided by total assets (WC02999) (Source:

Datastream).

Returns Is the natural logarithm of (RIt/RIt-12), where RI is the Datastream Monthly

Return Index on the first day of the month (Source: Datastream).

Return Index over the fiscal year (Source: Datastream).

Cash flow Is cash flows from operating activities (WC04860) divided by total debt

(WC03255) (Source: Datastream).

Current ratio Is current assets (WC02201) divided by current liabilities (WC03101) (Source:

Datastream).

Interest coverage Is earnings before interest and taxes (WC18191) divided by interest expense

(WC01251) (Source: Datastream).

O-Score Ohlson's (1980) measure of default risk, equals -1.32 - 0.407 (natural log of

total assets (WC02999)) + 6.03 (total liabilities (WC03351)/total assets (WC02999)) - 1.43 (working capital (WC02201 - WC03101)/total assets (WC02999)) + 0.076 (current liabilities (WC03101)/current assets (WC02201)) - 1.72 (1 if total liabilities (WC03351)[total assets (WC02999) and 0 otherwise) - 0.521 ((net income<sub>t</sub> (WC01651) - net income<sub>t-1</sub> (WC01651))/(|net income<sub>t</sub>| (WC01651) + |net income<sub>t-1</sub>| (WC01651))) (Source:

Datastream).

### Supplementary\_Table\_III Continued

Readability Is the natural logarithm of the number pages in the annual report (PageCount)

multiplied by -1.

Readability words Is the natural logarithm of number of words in the annual report multiplied by

-1.

Cross listed Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed, and 0 otherwise

(WC05427) (Source: Datastream).

Debt market access Is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if the firm has had prior access

to the public debt market, and 0 otherwise (Source: Thomson ONE Banker).

Significant change Is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm's change in pension

deficit (either increase or decrease) is at least 20% from the previous year, and

0 otherwise.

No. of analysts Is the total number of analysts following the firm (EPS1NET) (Source:

Datastream).

Sales growth over 5 years Is the natural logarithm of the annul percentage growth in sales over the 5 years

prior to debt issuance (WC08635) (Source: Datastream).

value of pension plan assets scaled by total assets (Source: hand-collected from

firms' annual reports).

Credit rating Standard & Poor's issuer credit rating on a scale of 2–27 for ratings AAA to D

or estimated firm rating based on the following equation (Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 1998; Florou & Kosi, 2015): Rating = a0 + a1 (total assets (WC02999)) + a2 (net income (WC01651)/total assets (WC02999)) + a3 (long-term debt (WC03251)/total assets (WC02999)) + a4 (1 if a firm paid dividends in the current year (WC05376) and 0 otherwise). This equation is estimated cross-sectionally and year-by-year. An estimated rating is then rounded to the nearest whole number with a minimum of 2 and maximum of 27 (Source:

Datastream).

Rated dummy Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is rated, and 0 otherwise.

Investment grade Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm's Standard & Poor's or estimated

credit rating (*Credit rating*) is investment grade (i.e. BBB- or higher) and 0 otherwise. If *Credit rating* is not available we estimate firm rating based on the following equation (Barth et al., 1998; Florou & Kosi, 2015): Rating = a0 + a1 (total assets (WC02999)) + a2 (net income (WC01651)/total assets (WC02999)) + a3 (long-term debt (WC03251)/total assets (WC02999)) + a4 (1 if the firm paid dividends in the current year (WC05376) and 0 otherwise). This equation is estimated cross-sectionally and year-by-year. An estimated rating is then rounded to the nearest whole number with a minimum of 2 and

maximum of 27 (Source: Datastream).

log(Sales growth) Is the natural logarithm of sales growth over the last three years (WC08633)

(Source: Datastream).

Big4 Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the big four

audit firms and 0 otherwise (WC07800) (Source: Datastream).

log(Age) Is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was founded

(BDATE) (Source: Datastream).

Bond/loan-specific variables

% of public debt Is the proportion of public debt to the total debt obtained in a given year.

firm issued private debt in a given year.

ONE Banker).

### Supplementary\_Table\_III Continued

(including any annual fees paid) (Source: DealScan).

log(Maturity) Is the natural logarithm of the number of months to final maturity (Source:

SDC Thomson ONE Banker/DealScan).

Thomson ONE Banker/DealScan).

Callable Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond has a callable feature, and 0

otherwise (Source: Thomson ONE Banker).

Bond investment grade Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond rating is investment grade, and 0

otherwise (Source: Thomson ONE Banker).

Private placement Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the debt is obtained through private

placements, and 0 otherwise (Source: Thomson ONE Banker).

Secured Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Bond/Loan is secured, and 0 otherwise

(Source: Thomson ONE Banker/DealScan).

Is a dummy variable that equals 1, if the firm issued in a particular year at least

one bond and one loan, and 0 otherwise (Source: Thomson ONE

Banker/DealScan).

#### Country-specific variables

Term spread The difference between 10-year and two-year government bond rates

calculated at a country-month level (Source: Datastream).

Inflation rate Inflation, consumer prices (monthly %) (Source: Datastream).

GDP growth Is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on

constant local currency (Source: Datastream).

Country law Is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is located in a common law

country, and 0 otherwise (Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &

Vishny, 1998).

money banks divided by a country's GDP calculated at a country-quarter level

(Source: Datastream).

Economic development The natural log of the per capita GDP (Source: Datastream).

Country prob. of default The probability of default of the firm's country of domicile in the year the debt

is issued. The National University of Singapore calculates the measure over different time horizons (from one to sixty months). We use the long-term measure (i.e. the estimated probability over sixty months) in order to mitigate the influence of short-term shocks on a country's probability of default. (Source: National University of Singapore, Risk Management Institute, see

http://rmicri.org, and Duan and Wang (2012)).4

Country rule of law Is the country rule of law measured based on the updated index developed by

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009)<sup>5</sup> to measure a country legal

enforcement.

Acc. enforcement Is the level of accounting enforcement in the country based on the index

developed by Brown, Preiato, and Tarca (2014).6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Duan, J.-C. and Wang, T. (2012). Measuring distance-to-default for financial and non-financial firms. *Global credit review*, 2(1), 95–108.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Brown, P., Preiato, J. and Tarca, A. (2014). Measuring country differences in enforcement of accounting standards: An audit and enforcement proxy. *Journal of Business Finance and Accounting*, 41(1–2), 1–52.

Supplementary\_Table\_IV: First-stage results (2SLS regression)

Panel A: The choice of debt market (Hypot		(2)
	(1)	(2)
	% of public debt	Public debt issue
	DV= Pension_ActuDisc.	DV= Pension_ActuDisc
Ind. Average Disclosure	0.72***	0.69***
I (G: )	(7.57)	(7.54)
log(Size)	0.02***	0.02***
	(3.14)	(2.68)
Tangibility	-0.00	-0.02
	(-0.00)	(-0.38)
MTB	0.01	0.01
	(0.81)	(0.85)
Debt market access	0.02	0.02
	(0.86)	(0.88)
Rated dummy	0.02	0.02
	(1.01)	(1.27)
ROA	0.09	0.09
	(0.46)	(0.49)
Leverage	0.02	0.04
	(0.41)	(0.65)
Issue both	0.00	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.03)
Readability	-0.03	-0.03
	(-1.21)	(-0.99)
Pension deficit	0.04	0.06
<b>,</b>	(0.37)	(0.55)
log(Debt amount)	-0.01	-0.01
teg(2 cer ameant)	(-1.60)	(-1.05)
log(Maturity)	0.00	0.01
108(17141411111)	(0.13)	(1.49)
GDP growth	-0.01	-0.01
ODI growin	(-0.81)	(-0.54)
Country prob. of default	2.93	4.16
Country prob. of dejauti	(0.53)	(0.90)
Constant	` ,	-0.21
Constant	-0.18	
	(-0.98)	(-1.18)
Country dummies	Included	Included
Year dummies	Included	Included
Industry dummies	Included	Included
Observations	661	761
Panel B: The impact on the cost of debt (Hyp		
	(1)	(2)
	Cost of public debt	Cost of private debt
	DV=Pension_ActuDisc.	DV=Pension_ActuDisc
Ind. Average Disclosure	0.75***	0.58***
-	(5.99)	(3.34)
log(Size)	0.02***	0.03**
	(2.66)	(2.11)
Tangibility	0.02	0.04
	(0.45)	(0.57)
MTB	0.01	-0.03
	(0.59)	(-1.11)
ROA	0.13	0.06
NO/1	(0.58)	(0.23)

<u> </u>	(1)	(2)
	Cost of public debt	Cost of private debt
	DV=Pension_ActuDisc.	DV=Pension_ActuDisc
Leverage	0.00	0.06
O	(0.01)	(0.62)
Returns	0.01	-0.02
	(0.43)	(-0.61)
Readability	-0.04	-0.05
,	(-0.90)	(-1.08)
Cross listed	-0.07***	-0.01
	(-3.04)	(-0.20)
Investment grade	-0.02	0.00
O	(-0.65)	(0.07)
Pension deficit	0.04	-0.03
	(0.28)	(-0.09)
log(Debt amount)	-0.00	-0.01
(	(-0.28)	(-1.00)
log(Maturity)	-0.00	0.01
37	(-0.14)	(0.23)
Callable	0.01	()
	(1.10)	
Private placement	-0.01	
	(-0.45)	
Term spread	0.02	-0.02
,	(0.74)	(-0.34)
Economic development	-0.06	-0.28
	(-0.42)	(-1.00)
Constant	0.29	2.54
	(0.20)	(1.01)
Loan Type dummies	not-Included	Included
Country dummies	Included	Included
Year dummies	Included	Included
Industry dummies	Included	Included
Observations	558	220

This table shows the first stage for the instrumental variable (IV) estimation. Panel A relates to the results presented in Table 4. The analyses presented in column 1, in Panel A, are based on a firm-level analysis, using the total debt obtained in a given year (% of public debt) as a dependent variable in the second stage (Eq.(2)), while the results in column 2, in Panel A, are based on an issue-level analysis using the access to the public debt market dummy (Public debt issue) after excluding multiple issues of the same type by a firm during a given year as a dependent variable in the second stage (Eq. (3)). Panel B relates to the results presented in Table 5. Column 1, in Panel B, presents the results when using the cost of public debt as a dependent variable in the second stage, while column 2, in Panel B, presents the results when using the cost of private debt as a dependent variable in the second stage. The instrumental variable is Ind. Average Disclosure, which represents a country-industry average level of compliance. The dependent variable in these first stages is Pension\_Actu.\_Disc.. Pension\_Actu.\_Disc. is the actual level of compliance with pension-related disclosures. All other variables are the same as in the main tests. Supplementary\_Table\_III above reports the detailed definitions and sources of all variables. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In parentheses, we report the t-statistics based on firm clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Supplementary\_Table\_V: Sensitivity analyses for access to the public debt market (Hypothesis 1)

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		% of pub	lic debt	Public de	ebt issue
(1) Significant char	nge in deficit				
	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.28***		1.41***	
		(3.06)		(2.76)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		$0.18^{**}$		1.03**
(A) A (A)			(2.28)		(2.41)
(2) Accounting for	multi-level observations wh	en running the	e regression on a	in issue level 1.41**	
	Pension_ActuDisc.			(2.56)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.			(2.50)	1.04**
					(2.34)
(3) Adding and/or	substituting control variable	es			
Cash flow	g				
cusit from	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.31***		1.44***	
		(3.32)		(2.79)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		0.25***	•	$1.05^{**}$
_			(3.10)		(2.43)
Current ratio	n	0.21***		1 40***	
	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.31*** (3.32)		1.40*** (2.75)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	(3.34)	0.25***	(2.73)	1.03**
	Tension_najDisc.		(3.10)		(2.43)
Credit rating			(5.20)		(=: 10)
Ü	Pension_ActuDisc.	$0.30^{***}$		1.41***	
		(3.30)		(2.76)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		0.24***		1.04**
n			(3.06)		(2.43)
Returns variability					
	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.30***		1.41***	
	n	(3.30)	0.04***	(2.76)	1 0 4**
	Pension_AdjDisc.		0.24***		1.04**
O-Score			(3.07)		(2.45)
o score	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.29***		1.42***	
		(3.13)		(2.79)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	, ,	0.23***	, ,	1.04**
_			(2.90)		(2.46)
Interest coverage	D 1 1 5	0.20***		1 22***	
	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.29***		1.33***	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	(3.21)	0.24***	(2.59)	1.00**
	1 ension_AujDisc.		(3.00)		(2.33)
Readability words			(3.00)		(2.33)
	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.29***		1.38***	
		(3.19)		(2.70)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		0.23***		1.02**
a			(2.95)		(2.35)
Sales growth over 5		0.30***		1.39***	
	Pension_ActuDisc.	(3.17)		(2.70)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	(3.17)	0.24***	(2.70)	1.01**
	<u></u>		(2.93)		(2.35)

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		% of public		Public deb	
No. of analysts		J 1			
	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.28***		1.18**	
		(3.09)		(2.33)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	()	0.23***	( )	$0.94^{**}$
			(2.85)		(2.09)
Country law			,		, ,
,	Pension_ActuDisc.	$0.30^{***}$		1.41***	
		(3.30)		(2.77)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	` /	$0.24^{***}$	` ,	$1.04^{**}$
			(3.06)		(2.43)
Inflation rate			( /		(=: :0)
J	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.30***		1.43***	
	1 5.5551100002 050.	(3.31)		(2.79)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	(5.51)	0.24***	()	1.02**
	Tension_1ag2se.		(3.02)		(2.39)
(4) Alternative dis	closure transformation		(3.02)		(2.37)
(4) Michaelyc dis	Logit transformed	0.06***		0.24***	
	Logii iransjormea	(3.15)		(2.86)	
(5) Eveluding firm	s with only material defined		alanc	(2.00)	
(5) Excluding III i		_	nans	1.20**	
	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.32***		1.29**	
		(3.07)	0.27***	(2.43)	0.02**
	Pension_AdjDisc.		0.25***		0.93**
(O. C.)			(2.83)		(2.07)
(6) Simultaneity o		++++			
	Pension_ActuDisc.	$0.70^{***}$			
		(2.15)			
(7) Alternative est	imation methods				
Tobit model					
	Pension_ActuDisc.	0.83***			
		(3.14)			
	Pension_AdjDisc.		$0.57^{***}$		
			(2.89)		
Logit model					
•	Pension_ActuDisc.			$2.30^{**}$	
				(2.24)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.			, ,	$1.34^{*}$
					(1.66)
(8) Different samp	le composition				( /
(-, sump	Pension_ActuDisc.			2.25***	
	Tomston_110tmDisc.			(2.76)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.			(2.70)	1.50***
	I chsion_najDisc.				(2.59)

The table summarises various sensitivity analyses performed in the study (see section 5 for further details). Columns 1 and 3 present the analyses for *Pension\_Actu.\_Disc.*, and columns 2 and 4 for *Pension\_Adj.\_Disc.* as the main variable. The first set of analyses accounts for the significant change in pension deficit from the previous year. The second set of analyses controls for multilevel observations using HLM regressions. The third set of analyses presents the results after including several firm-, issue- and country-specific variables. The fourth set of analyses presents the results after employing an alternative disclosure metric, namely, the logit transformation. The fifth set of analyses excludes firms with only material defined contribution pension plans, i.e. constraining the sample to firms with material defined benefit pension plans. The sixth set of analyses presents the results for the simultaneous equation. Since under Eq. (3) the dependent variable (*Public debt issue*) is a binary variable and the model estimates the probability of accessing the public debt market, we do not apply the simultaneous equation

when the dependent variable is *Public debt issue*. The seventh set of tests presents the analyses using a Tobit regression when estimating Eq. (2), and the logit regression when estimating Eq. (3). The last set of analyses presents the results of Eq. (3) on a firm level, instead of an issue level, after excluding firms that accessed both the public and the private debt markets in the same year. In this case, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm accessed the public debt market, and 0 otherwise. We exclude the variable *Readability* when we include the variable *Readability Words*. Unless otherwise stated, all control variables and fixed effects are included as in the original model. Supplementary\_Table\_III above reports the detailed definitions and sources of all variables. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In parentheses, we report the t-statistics based on firm clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Supplementary\_Table\_VI: Sensitivity analyses for the cost of debt (Hypotheses 2 and 3)

	ie_v1: Sensitivity analys	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Cost of publi	ic debt	Cost of priv	
(1) Significant chang					
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-138.55***		-33.02	
	Dangion Ad: Di-	(-2.63)	-91.23**	(-0.67)	-4.99
	Pension_AdjDisc.		-91.23 (-2.42)		-4.99 (-0.13)
(2) Accounting for m	ulti-level observations wh	en running the		n issue level	(-0.13)
(2) Hecounting for in	Pension_ActuDisc.	-117.00***		-52.00	
		(-2.28)		(-1.27)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		-47.83*		19.31
(2) 1 111 1/			(-1.68)		(0.72)
	bstituting control variable	es			
Cash flows	Pension_ActuDisc.	-151.26***		-68.20	
	Tension_ActuDisc.	(-2.80)		(-1.39)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	(2.00)	-95.99 <sup>**</sup>	(1.5)	-21.45
	_ ,_		(-2.41)		(-0.55)
Current ratio					
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-149.94***		-39.28	
	- C	(-2.75)		(-0.76)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	· · · · /	-94.09**	· · · · · /	-8.46
			(-2.33)		(-0.21)
Credit rating					
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-147.07***		-39.21	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	(-2.76)	-91.41**	(-0.75)	2.27
	Tension_AujDisc.		(-2.33)		(0.05)
Rated			(2.55)		(0.02)
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-148.77***		-41.85	
		(-2.71)	**	(-0.81)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		-93.98**		-8.63
Datuma nasiahilita			(-2.33)		(-0.22)
Returns variability	Pension_ActuDisc.	-149.60***		-44.14	
	Tension_HemDisc.	(-2.77)		(-0.86)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	· · · · /	-94.46**	(/	-10.95
	• —		(-2.38)		(-0.27)
O-Score	<b>.</b>	4 7 0 0 2 ***		a=	
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-150.83***		-37.31	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	(-2.86)	-99.63**	(-0.72)	-8.75
	i ension_AajDisc.		-99.03 (-2.55)		-8.73 (-0.22)
Interest coverage			( 2.55)		(0.22)
Ü	Pension_ActuDisc.	-143.78***		-46.28	
		(-2.76)		(-0.88)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		-93.90**		-10.63
Dondakilia 1			(-2.44)		(-0.26)
Readability words	Pension_ActuDisc.	-151.68***		-38.85	
	1 chaton_1CiuDisc.	(-2.81)		(-0.79)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	( 2.01)	-95.78**	( 3.77)	-6.53
	·_ ····		(-2.40)		(-0.17)

	e VI continued	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Cost of publi	` '	Cost of priv	. ,
Sales growth over 5 y	vears	<u> </u>		V 1	
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-147.78*** (-2.74)		-66.19 (-1.28)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		-92.92** (-2.35)		-32.44 (-0.87)
No. of analysts					
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-162.65*** (-3.18)		-32.03 (-0.64)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		-107.33*** (-2.64)		-6.34 (-0.16)
Bond investment grad	le				
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-124.85*** (-2.69)			
	Pension_AdjDisc.		-64.95* (-1.96)		
Secured		ato dicate		_	
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-145.46*** (-2.74)		-32.44 (-0.68)	
_	Pension_AdjDisc.		-91.38** (-2.32)		-0.71 (-0.02)
Country law	Pension_ActuDisc.	-151.22***		-42.12	
		(-2.80)		(-0.81)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		-95.74** (-2.40)		-9.16 (-0.23)
Inflation rate	Pension_ActuDisc.	-153.30***		-44.15	
	Tension_AciuDisc.	(-2.82)		(-0.83)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	(2.02)	-100.53** (-2.42)	(0.00)	-9.73 (-0.23)
Country prob. of defa	ult		, ,		` ′
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-151.12*** (-2.80)		-37.43 (-0.73)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.		-96.91** (-2.43)		-10.43 (-0.26)
Banking development				<b>20.5</b> 0	
	Pension_ActuDisc.			-59.29 (-1.28)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.				-3.19 (-0.08)
(4) Alternative discl	osure transformation	10.70**		0.11	
	Logit transformed	-18.72** (-2.26)		-0.11 (-0.01)	
(5) Excluding Firms	with only material defined	I contribution p	lans	20.75	
	Pension_ActuDisc.	-147.59*** (-2.65)		-39.75 (-0.70)	
	Pension_AdjDisc.	(-2.03)	-94.71**	(-0.70)	-3.35
(6) Simultanaity of 4	·		(-2.39)		(-0.09)
(6) Simultaneity of t	ne disciosure  Pension_ActuDisc.	-261.71**		-75.45	
	i ension_AciuDisc.	(-2.34)		-73.43 (-0.46)	

The table summarises various sensitivity analyses performed in the study (see section 5 for further details). Columns 1 and 3 present the analyses for *Pension\_Actu.\_Disc.*, and columns 2 and 4 for *Pension\_Adj.\_Disc.* as

the main variable. The first set of analyses accounts for the significant change in pension deficit from the previous year. The second set of analyses controls for multilevel observations using HLM regressions. Since we run the regression on a firm level, not an issue level, when we use the market continuous variable (% of public debt), we do not use the HLM regression. The third set of analyses presents the results after including several firm-, issue-, and country-specific variables. The fourth set of analyses presents the results after employing an alternative disclosure metric, namely, the logit transformation. The fifth set of analyses excludes firms with only material defined contribution pension plans, i.e. constraining the sample to firms with material defined benefit pension plans. The sixth set of analyses presents the results for the simultaneous equation. We exclude the variable Readability when we include the variable Readability Words. Unless otherwise stated, all control variables and fixed effects are included as in the original model. Supplementary\_Table\_III above reports the detailed definitions and sources of all variables. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In parentheses, we report the t-statistics based on firm clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.