Evidence, experience, and externalism

Lyons, J. C. (2008) Evidence, experience, and externalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(3), pp. 461-479. (doi: 10.1080/00048400801886363)

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The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing. By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), I hope to show that the Sellarsian dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories. But this reconceived version of the argument does not support coherentism. Instead, I use it to argue for a strongly externalist epistemology.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J. C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Taylor and Francis
ISSN (Online):1471-6828
Published Online:22 July 2008

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