Bidding styles of institutional investors in IPO auctions

Güçbilmez, U. and Briain, T. Ó. (2021) Bidding styles of institutional investors in IPO auctions. Journal of Financial Markets, 53, 100579. (doi: 10.1016/j.finmar.2020.100579)

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We examine the bidding behavior of institutional investors in initial public offering (IPO) auctions using a hand-collected dataset of limit bids. We find that the majority of institutional investors in our sample are “occasional bidders,” who rarely get a share allocation. “Regular bidders” are in a minority but account for the bulk of the demand. They bid conservatively, and only a few of them can be classified as “well-informed bidders,” who place more aggressive bids in hotter IPOs than in colder ones. Our findings suggest that “dirty” auctions that are restricted to institutional investors work as an information extraction mechanism.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Gucbilmez, Dr Ufuk
Authors: Güçbilmez, U., and Briain, T. Ó.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Accounting and Finance
Journal Name:Journal of Financial Markets
ISSN (Online):1878-576X
Published Online:02 June 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 Elsevier B.V.
First Published:First published in Journal of Financial Markets 53: 100579
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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