Carving the mind at its (not necessarily modular) joints

Lyons, J.C. (2001) Carving the mind at its (not necessarily modular) joints. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52(2), pp. 277-302. (doi: 10.1093/bjps/52.2.277)

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Abstract

The cognitive enuropsychological understanding of a cognitive system is roughly that of a ‘mental organ’, which is independent of other systems, specializes in some cognitive task, and exhibits a certain kind of internal cohesiveness. This is all quite vague, and I try to make it more precise. A more precise understanding of cognitive systems will make it possible to articulate in some detail an alternative to the Fodorian doctrine of modularity (since not all cognitive systems are modules), but it will also provide a better understanding of what a module is (since all modules are cognitive systems).

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J.C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Publisher:Oxford University Press
ISSN:0007-0882
ISSN (Online):1464-3537

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