In defense of epiphenomenalism

Lyons, J. C. (2006) In defense of epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology, 19(6), pp. 767-794. (doi: 10.1080/09515080601001861)

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Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive physicalism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive physicalism does not imply epiphenomenalism but because the epiphenomenalist implication is actually a virtue of the theory, rather than a vice. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J. C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Psychology
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN (Online):1465-394X
Published Online:23 November 2006

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