Perception and virtue reliabilism

Lyons, J. C. (2009) Perception and virtue reliabilism. Acta Analytica, 24(4), pp. 249-261. (doi: 10.1007/s12136-009-0064-2)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.


In some recent work, Ernest Sosa rejects the “perceptual model” of rational intuition, according to which intuitive beliefs (e.g., that 2+2=4) are justified by standing in the appropriate relation to a nondoxastic intellectual experience (a seeming-true, or the like), in much the way that perceptual beliefs are often held to be justified by an appropriate relation to nondoxastic sense experiential states. By extending some of Sosa’s arguments and adding a few of my own, I argue that Sosa is right to reject the perceptual model of intuition, and that we should reject the “perceptual model” of perception as well. Rational intuition and perception should both receive a virtue theoretic (e.g., reliabilist) account, rather than an evidentialist one. To this end, I explicitly argue against the Grounds Principle, which holds that all justified beliefs must be based on some adequate reason, or ground.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2009 Bled Philosophical Conference.
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J. C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Acta Analytica
ISSN (Online):1874-6349

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record