Unencapsulated modules and perceptual judgment

Lyons, J. C. (2015) Unencapsulated modules and perceptual judgment. In: Zeimbekis, J. and Raftopoulos, A. (eds.) The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Oxford University Press, pp. 102-122. ISBN 9780198738916 (doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.003.0004)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.


To what extent are cognitive capacities, especially perceptual capacities, informationally encapsulated and to what extent are they cognitively penetrable? And why does this matter? Two reasons we care about encapsulation/penetrability are: (a) encapsulation is sometimes held to be definitional of modularity, and (b) penetrability has epistemological implications independent of modularity. This chapter argues that modularity does not require encapsulation; that modularity may have epistemological implications independently of encapsulation; and that the epistemological implications of the cognitive penetrability of perception are messier than is sometimes thought.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J. C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:Oxford University Press
Related URLs:

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record