Experiential evidence?

Lyons, J. C. (2016) Experiential evidence? Philosophical Studies, 173(4), pp. 1053-1079. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-015-0540-z)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Abstract

Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from conflating two importantly different conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, although not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a reading of the Sellarsian dilemma that differs from the version standardly encountered in contemporary epistemology, one that is aimed initially at the epistemology of introspection but which generalizes to theories of perceptual justification as well.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J. C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0031-8116
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:25 August 2015

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record