Goldman on evidence and reliability

Lyons, J. (2016) Goldman on evidence and reliability. In: McLaughlin, B. P. and Kornblith, H. (eds.) Goldman and his Critics. Wiley Blackwell. ISBN 9780470673850

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Goldman, though still a reliabilist, has made some recent concessions to evidentialist epistemologies. I agree that reliabilism is most plausible when it incorporates certain evidentialist elements, but I try to minimize the evidentialist component. I argue that fewer beliefs require evidence than Goldman thinks, that Goldman should construe evidential fit in process reliabilist terms, rather than the way he does, and that this process reliabilist understanding of evidence illuminates such important epistemological concepts as propositional justification, ex ante justification, and defeat.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:Wiley Blackwell

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