Unconscious evidence

Lyons, J. (2016) Unconscious evidence. Philosophical Issues, 26(1), pp. 243-262. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12073)

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Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person‐level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled framework for solving other problems.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Issues
ISSN (Online):1758-2237
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