Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception

Lyons, J. (2011) Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception. Philosophical Issues, 21(1), pp. 289-311. (doi: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00205.x)

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Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Issues
ISSN (Online):1758-2237

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