Inferentialism and cognitive penetration of perception

Lyons, J. C. (2016) Inferentialism and cognitive penetration of perception. Episteme, 13(1), pp. 1-28. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2015.60)

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Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see (hear, taste, etc.) is influenced by such “cognitive” states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that (a) some experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and (b) the familiar canons of good inference provide the appropriate standards by which experiences are evaluated. I examine recent defenses of inferentialism by Susanna Siegel, Peter Markie, and Matthew McGrath and argue that the prospects for inferentialism are dim.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:Special Issue 1 (The Epistemology of Perception).
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack
Authors: Lyons, J. C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Episteme
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISSN (Online):1750-0117
Published Online:09 February 2016

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