Thomson, R., Torenvlied, R. and Judge, A. (2020) Incentives to comply: the impact of national governments’ and stakeholders’ preferences on compliance with EU laws. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(12), pp. 1801-1818. (doi: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1699593)
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Abstract
Established explanations of differences in compliance outcomes highlight the policy preferences of implementers. The application of these theories to compliance with EU laws focuses on national governments and stakeholders. This study improves on existing conceptualisations of governments’ and stakeholders’ preferences by distinguishing between their incentives to deviate from, conform to and exceed the standards contained in EU laws. We apply these concepts to detailed evidence on national governments’ and stakeholders’ policy preferences and national governments’ transposition records. The study finds that incentives to conform and exceed are generally more frequent than incentives to deviate. Moreover, the policy preferences of national governments and stakeholders are linked, as governments’ preferences often agree with national stakeholders’ demands. Both national governments’ and stakeholders’ incentives to comply positively affect the timeliness of transposition.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Judge, Dr Andrew |
Authors: | Thomson, R., Torenvlied, R., and Judge, A. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics |
Journal Name: | Journal of European Public Policy |
Publisher: | Taylor and Francis |
ISSN: | 1350-1763 |
ISSN (Online): | 1466-4429 |
Published Online: | 10 December 2019 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group |
First Published: | First published in Journal of European Public Policy 27(12): 1801-1818 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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