Satisficing consequentialism still doesn't satisfy

Slater, J. (2020) Satisficing consequentialism still doesn't satisfy. Utilitas, 32(1), pp. 108-117. (doi: 10.1017/S0953820819000402)

Abstract

Satisficing consequentialism is an unpopular theory. Because it permits gratuitous sub-optimal behaviour, it strikes many as wildly implausible. It has been widely rejected as a tenable moral theory for more than twenty years. In this article, I rehearse the arguments behind this unpopularity, before examining an attempt to redeem satisficing. Richard Yetter Chappell has recently defended a form of ‘effort satisficing consequentialism’. By incorporating an ‘effort ceiling’ – a limit on the amount of willpower a situation requires – and requiring that agents produce at least as much good as they could given how much effort they are exerting, Chappell avoids the obvious objections. However, I demonstrate that the revised theory is susceptible to a different objection, and that the resulting view requires that any supererogatory behaviour must be efficient, which fails to match typical moral verdicts.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Slater, Dr Joe
• Authors: Slater, J.
• College/School: College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Utilitas
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• ISSN: 0953-8208
• ISSN (Online): 1741-6183
• Published Online: 18 October 2019
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2019 Cambridge University Press
• First Published: First published in Utilitas 32(1):108-117
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy