The puzzle of moral memory

Cowan, R. (2020) The puzzle of moral memory. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 17(2), pp. 202-228. (doi: 10.1163/17455243-20192914)

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Abstract

A largely overlooked and puzzling feature of morality is Moral Memory: apparent cases of directly memorising, remembering, and forgetting first-order moral propositions seem odd. To illustrate: consider someone apparently memorising that capital punishment is wrong, or acting as if they are remembering that euthanasia is permissible, or reporting that they have forgotten that torture is wrong. I here clarify Moral Memory and identify desiderata of good explanations. I then proceed to amend the only extant account, Bugeja’s (2016) Non-Cognitivist explanation, but show that it isn’t superior to a similar Cognitivist-friendly view, and that both explanations face a counterexample. Following this, I consider and reject a series of alternative Cognitivist-friendly explanations, suggesting that a Practicality-Character explanation that appeals to the connection between the practicality of moral attitude and character is superior. However, I conclude that support for this explanation should remain conditional and tentative.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Cowan, Dr Robert
Authors: Cowan, R.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Journal of Moral Philosophy
Publisher:Brill
ISSN:1740-4681
ISSN (Online):1745-5243
Published Online:05 February 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 Robert Cowan
First Published:First published in Journal of Moral Philosophy 17(2): 202-228
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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