Simion, M. (2019) Knowledge‐first functionalism. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), pp. 254-267. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12152)
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Abstract
This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Simion, Professor Mona |
Authors: | Simion, M. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Research Group: | Cogito |
Journal Name: | Philosophical Issues |
Publisher: | Wiley |
ISSN: | 1533-6077 |
ISSN (Online): | 1758-2237 |
Published Online: | 02 September 2019 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
First Published: | First published in Philosophical Issues 29(1): 254-267 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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