Knowledge‐first functionalism

Simion, M. (2019) Knowledge‐first functionalism. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), pp. 254-267. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12152)

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This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:Cogito
Journal Name:Philosophical Issues
ISSN (Online):1758-2237
Published Online:02 September 2019
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
First Published:First published in Philosophical Issues 29(1): 254-267
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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