Is epistemic blame distinct from moral blame?

Meehan, D. (2019) Is epistemic blame distinct from moral blame? Logos and Episteme, 10(2), pp. 183-194.

Abstract

In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame. This view, which I refer to as ‘epistemic blame skepticism,’ seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of moral or practical blame. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against a reductionist objection to epistemic blame, offered by Trent Dougherty in “Reducing Responsibility.” This paper will object to Dougherty’s position by examining an account in favour of epistemic blame and demonstrate concerns over the reductionist methodology employed by Dougherty to argue for his sceptical position.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: This article can be distributed, copied and transmitted on the web, but only for non-commercial purposes.
• Keywords: Epistemology, ethics, blame, scepticism, reductionism, responsibility.
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Meehan, Daniella
• Authors: Meehan, D.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Research Group: COGITO
• Journal Name: Logos and Episteme
• Publisher: Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy.
• ISSN: 2069-0533
• ISSN (Online): 2069-3052
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2019 Logos and Episteme
• First Published: First published in Logos and Episteme 10(2): 183-194
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy