Relativism and externalism

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Relativism and externalism. In: Kusch, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge: London. ISBN 9781138484283

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Abstract

Internalists in epistemology think that whether one possesses epistemic statuses such as knowledge or justification depends on factors that are internal to one; externalists think that whether one possesses these statuses can depend on factors that are external to one. In this chapter we focus on the relationship between externalism and epistemic relativism. Externalism isn’t straightforwardly incompatible with epistemic relativism but, as we’ll see, it is very common to hold that key externalist insights block or undermine some standard arguments for epistemic relativism. Our aim in this chapter is to give a broad overview of why externalism poses a problem for standard arguments for relativism. But we also want to discuss some – admittedly less developed – ways in which some externalist ideas might actually provide support for certain forms of epistemic relativism.

Item Type:Book Sections
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and McKenna, R.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:Routledge
ISBN:9781138484283
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 the contributors
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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