Varieties of cognitive integration

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2020) Varieties of cognitive integration. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 867-890. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12288)

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Abstract

Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent’s cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Kallestrup, J.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Noûs
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0029-4624
ISSN (Online):1468-0068
Published Online:10 May 2019
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
First Published:First published in Noûs 54(4): 867-890
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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