Tax sparing agreements, territorial tax reforms, and foreign direct investment

Azémar, C. and Dharmapala, D. (2019) Tax sparing agreements, territorial tax reforms, and foreign direct investment. Journal of Public Economics, 169, pp. 89-108. (doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.013)

[img] Text
177270.pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

392kB

Abstract

The governments of many developing countries seek to attract inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) through the use of tax incentives for multinational corporations (MNCs). The effectiveness of these tax incentives depends crucially on MNCs' residence country tax regime, especially where the residence country imposes worldwide taxation on foreign income. Tax sparing provisions are included in many bilateral tax treaties to prevent host country tax incentives being nullified by residence country taxation. We analyse the impact of tax sparing provisions using panel data on bilateral FDI stocks from 23 OECD countries in 113 developing and transition economies over the period 2002–2012, coding tax sparing provisions in all bilateral tax treaties among these countries. We find that tax sparing agreements are associated with up to 97 % higher FDI. The estimated effect is concentrated in the year following the entry into force of tax sparing agreements, with no effects in prior years, and is thus consistent with a causal interpretation. Four countries – Norway in 2004, and the U.K., Japan, and New Zealand in 2009 – enacted tax reforms that moved them from worldwide to territorial taxation, potentially changing the value of their pre-existing tax sparing agreements. However, there is no detectable effect of these reforms on bilateral FDI in tax sparing countries, relative to nonsparing countries. These results are consistent with tax sparing being an important determinant of FDI in developing countries for MNCs from both worldwide and territorial home countries.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Azemar, Professor Celine
Authors: Azémar, C., and Dharmapala, D.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Public Economics
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0047-2727
ISSN (Online):1879-2316
Published Online:23 November 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V.
First Published:First published in Journal of Public Economics 169:89-108
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record