Hermeneutical injustice as basing failure

Simion, M. (2019) Hermeneutical injustice as basing failure. In: Carter, J. A. and Bondy, P. (eds.) Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

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This paper defends a novel view of hermeneutical epistemic injustice (HEI). To this effect, it starts by arguing that Miranda Fricker’s account is too restrictive: hermeneutical epistemic injustice is more ubiquitous than her account allows. That is because, contra Fricker, conceptual ignorance is not necessary for HEI: hermeneutical epistemic injustice essentially involves a failure in concept application rather than in concept possession. Further on, I unpack hermeneutical epistemic injustice as unjustly brought about basing failure. Last, I show that, if this view right, HEI is a form of distributive injustice, and affords the corresponding traditional normative theorising.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:Cogito

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