Assertion: just one way to take it back

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: just one way to take it back. Logos and Episteme, 7(3), pp. 385-391.

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According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the normativity of action.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:Cogito
Journal Name:Logos and Episteme
Publisher:Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy
ISSN (Online):2069-3052
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 Logos and Episteme
First Published:First published in Logos and Episteme 7(3): 385-391
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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