Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: just one way to take it back. Logos and Episteme, 7(3), pp. 385-391.
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Publisher's URL: http://logos-and-episteme.acadiasi.ro/assertion-just-one-way-to-take-it-back-pages-385-391/
Abstract
According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the normativity of action.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Simion, Professor Mona |
Authors: | Simion, M. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Research Group: | Cogito |
Journal Name: | Logos and Episteme |
Publisher: | Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy |
ISSN: | 2069-0533 |
ISSN (Online): | 2069-3052 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2016 Logos and Episteme |
First Published: | First published in Logos and Episteme 7(3): 385-391 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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