Simion, M. (2018) The explanation proffering norm of moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), pp. 477-488. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6)
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Abstract
In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Simion, Professor Mona |
Authors: | Simion, M. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Research Group: | Cogito |
Journal Name: | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 1386-2820 |
ISSN (Online): | 1572-8447 |
Published Online: | 24 August 2018 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2018 The Authors |
First Published: | First published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21(3): 477-488 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons License |
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