Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content

Boult, C., Kelp, C. , Schnurr, J. and Simion, M. (2020) Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 42-57. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.003)

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The investigation of epistemic virtues, such as curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual humility is a growing trend in epistemology. An underexplored question in this context is: what is the relationship between these virtues and other types of virtue, such as moral or prudential virtue? This paper argues that, although there is an intuitive sense in which virtues such as intellectual courage and open-mindedness have something to do with the epistemic domain, on closer inspection it is not clear to what extent they should be understood as genuine epistemic virtues. We draw a distinction between epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content and provide reason to believe that the aforementioned virtues are moral virtues with epistemic content rather than bona fide epistemic virtues. The upshot is that there are far fewer epistemic virtues out there than commonly assumed.

Item Type:Book Sections (Other)
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona and Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Boult, C., Kelp, C., Schnurr, J., and Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:Cogito
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
Published Online:01 July 2020

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