Dividing bads under additive utilities

Bogomolnaia, A. , Moulin, H. , Sandomirskiy, F. and Yanovskaia, E. (2019) Dividing bads under additive utilities. Social Choice and Welfare, 52(3), pp. 395-417. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-018-1157-x)

Abstract

We compare the Egalitarian rule (aka Egalitarian Equivalent) and the Competitive rule (aka Comeptitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) to divide bads (chores). They are both welfarist: the competitive disutility profile(s) are the critical points of their Nash product on the set of efficient feasible profiles. The C rule is Envy Free, Maskin Monotonic, and has better incentives properties than the E rule. But, unlike the E rule, it can be wildly multivalued, admits no selection continuous in the utility and endowment parameters, and is harder to compute. Thus in the division of bads, unlike that of goods, no rule normatively dominates the other.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna and Moulin, Professor Herve
• Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F., and Yanovskaia, E.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Social Choice and Welfare
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0176-1714
• ISSN (Online): 1432-217X
• Published Online: 16 October 2018
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2018 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Social Choice and Welfare 52(3): 395-417
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License