Hybrid institutions in the national security constitution: the case of the Commissioners

Scott, P. F. (2019) Hybrid institutions in the national security constitution: the case of the Commissioners. Legal Studies, 39(3), pp. 432-454. (doi: 10.1017/lst.2018.44)

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Abstract

This paper proposes the concept of a ‘hybrid institution’, defined with reference to certain institutions within the UK's constitutional order which provide oversight of national security processes. It focuses in particular on the Commissioners who have overseen and oversee the use of investigatory powers and the work of the intelligence services. These institutions, as was once said of another hybrid institution – the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation – are designed in order to operate within situations in which ‘potential conflicts between state power and civil liberties are acute, but information is tightly rationed’. They are ‘hybrid’ institutions in that they marry certain of the features characteristic of political institutions with others characteristic of legal institutions. The paper considers the relevant institutions and the role they play within the national security constitution, showing how their hybrid status facilitates the performance of a function which neither fully legal nor fully political institutions could fulfil.

Item Type:Articles (Editorial)
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Scott, Mr Paul
Authors: Scott, P. F.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Law
Journal Name:Legal Studies
Journal Abbr.:LS
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISSN:0261-3875
ISSN (Online):1748-121X
Published Online:26 March 2019
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2019 The Society of Legal Scholars
First Published:First published in Legal Studies 39(3): 432-454
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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