Strategic bias in discrete choice experiments

Meginnis, K. , Burton, M., Chan, R. and Rigby, D. (2021) Strategic bias in discrete choice experiments. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 109, 102163. (doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.010)

167503.pdf - Accepted Version



An induced value laboratory experiment is conducted to explore the vulnerability of discrete choice experiments to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. We consider strategic behaviour to arise when an agent: (i) believes the choice experiment will be used to determine a provision decision over a discrete set of alternatives; and (ii) has expectations about the relative likelihood of those alternatives being selected and delivered. In the experiment, agents receive induced values for the discrete set of provisioning alternatives. In treatments where agents receive information that their first best outcome is unlikely to win, we investigate the extent to which their choices change, in a manner consistent with them seeking to deliver their second best outcome in the provisioning decision. We find that 27% of respondents misrepresent their preferences and reveal evidence of strategic bias. We find that this behaviour is sufficient to change inferences about preferred provision at the aggregate level.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Meginnis, Dr Keila
Authors: Meginnis, K., Burton, M., Chan, R., and Rigby, D.
College/School:College of Medical Veterinary and Life Sciences > School of Biodiversity, One Health & Veterinary Medicine
Journal Name:Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
ISSN (Online):1096-0449
Published Online:07 September 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc
First Published:First published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 109: 102163
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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