Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education

Carter, J. A. (2020) Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 54(2), 449-466-449-466. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9752.12420)

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Abstract

What cognitive goods do children plausibly have a right to in an education? In attempting to answer this question, I begin with a puzzle centred around Feinberg’s (2007) observation that a denial of certain cognitive goods can violate a child’s right to an open future. I show that propositionalist, dispositionalist and objectualist characterisations of the kinds of cognitive goods children have a right to run in to problems. A promising alternative is then proposed and defended, one that is inspired in the main by Wittgenstein’s (1969) ‘hinge’ epistemology as developed in his posthumous On Certainty.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Journal of Philosophy of Education
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0309-8249
ISSN (Online):1467-9752
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 The Author
First Published:First published in Journal of Philosophy of Education 54(2):449-466
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons Licence

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